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Abstract  
Based on a literature review and a single case study approach, this paper 
provides insights into the actors, interests and dynamics of charter losses. It 
reports the results of interviews with 20 managers at different units of Siemens 
ICN (Information & Communication Network division) in Germany, Hungary and 
Austria, including the Hungarian subsidiary where the charter loss occurred, the 
German headquarters, and the main competing subsidiaries. Furthermore, the 
paper sheds light on the questions: to what extent and by what combination of 
host country, subsidiary-related and MNC structural and organizational factors 
do situations develop in which a subsidiary loses its charter. Our findings show 
that there is no single reason for a charter loss, but multiple interdependent 
reasons subject to divergent interpretations, reflecting the micropolitical 
interests of the key actors. The case study further elucidates that there is room 
for strategic action at the subsidiary level to avert a charter loss, whereby 
anticipatory adjustment of the subsidiary towards more balanced internal and 
external embeddedness as well as constant interpersonal networking with the 
headquarters office are two important prerequisites.  
 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich auf Basis einer Fallstudie mit der Frage, warum 
Tochtergesellschaften multinationaler Unternehmen Mandate verlieren. 
Mandate sind zeitlich und inhaltlich befristete, von der Unternehmenszentrale 
eines multinationalen Unternehmens verliehene oder von einzelnen Tochter-
gesellschaften errungene Kompetenzen bzw. Verantwortlichkeiten, die die 
konzerninterne Arbeitsteilung in einem multinationalen Unternehmen definieren. 
Es werden Ergebnisse aus Interviews mit mehr als 20 Managern der Siemens-
Sparte für Vermittlungstechnik (Information and Communications Networks oder 
kurz ICN) in Deutschland, Ungarn und Österreich präsentiert. Der Beitrag 
verdeutlicht, dass es verschiedene interdependente Ursachen für Mandats-
verluste gibt, die je nach den mikro-politischen Interessen der wesentlichen 
Akteure unterschiedlich interpretiert werden. Die Fallstudie verweist zugleich 
auf Spielräume für strategisches Handeln auf der Tochtergesellschaftsebene. 
Wesentliche Ansatzpunkte sind dabei eine strategische Ausbalancierung von 
interner und externer Eingebundenheit der Tochtergesellschaft sowie eine stark 
auf interpersonelle Kontakte abstellende Vernetzung der Tochtergesellschafts-
manager mit der Konzernzentrale.  
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The present paper examines the case of a charter loss at a German-owned 
subsidiary in Hungary during the first 15 years of transition and investigates the 
reasons for subsidiary charter losses in multinational corporations. Former sur-
veys, often conducted in a West European context, have focused on positive 
development of the subsidiaries' strategic responsibilities and how those entities 
have extended their activities over time with regard to market, product and 
value-adding activities (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1997; Delany, 1998; Egelhoff et al., 
1998; Hood et al., 1994; Jarillo & Martinez, 1990; Pearce, 1999; Taggart, 1998, 
1999; Williams, 1998). Only a few studies, like Galunic & Eisenhardt (1996); 
Birkinshaw (1996) and Hood and Young (1982) have paid attention to the rea-
sons for subsidiary business area demotion. The paper investigates the reasons 
for subsidiary charter losses and further contributes by examining this topic in 
an East European context. Our data, acquired through 20 interviews with man-
agers in the German headquarters of Siemens ICN its Hungarian subsidiary 
and other (competing) subsidiaries provides a detailed picture of the reasons, 
dynamics and different interests related to charter losses. We begin by summa-
rizing the reasons for subsidiary charter losses, as ascertained by reviewing the 
literature on subsidiary roles. Next, we proceed to discuss methodological 
issues and examine the case. In the final section, we conclude and discuss 
implications for management practices.  
2 Literature  Review 
A multinational corporation (MNC) is a corporation which owns or controls pro-
duction or service facilities located outside of the country in which it is based. 
Headquarters organizes its activities by decentrally delegating business areas 
and strategic responsibilities to its subsidiaries. Therefore, various subsidiaries 
are “chartered” to look after a certain business area. Galunic & Eisenhardt 
(1996, p. 256) define a charter as: "the businesses (i.e., product and market 
arenas) in which a division actively participates and for which it is responsible 
within the corporation"
2. By this definition, a charter defines a subsidiary’s prod-
uct or service line and the markets on which these product or services are to be 
                                            
1  Special thanks to Sigrid Quack and Frank McDonald for their critical comments and helpful 
suggestions for revisions. 
2  Galunic and Eisenhardt's level of analysis is the division of an MNC, but in this paper, the 
concept of charter is used at the subsidiary level.  
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sold. On the other hand, a charter also stipulates the strategic responsibilities 
granted to a subsidiary, often deciding its level of autonomy, i.e., the degree to 
which the subsidiary can make strategic or operational decisions without con-
sulting headquarters (O’Donnell, 2000). Additionally, a subsidiary is character-
ized by the role it plays in the MNC, i.e., by the activities it carries out. White & 
Poynter (1984) grouped the roles of foreign-owned subsidiaries into five main 
categories, and this classification has since been a central reference point for 
several subsidiary development studies (Hood et al., 1994; Delany, 1998; 
Taggart, 1999). According to White & Poynter (1984), marketing satellites are 
subsidiaries that market single products or whole ranges of products in the host 
country (with some limited customer service provided too). Miniature replicas 
not only market single products in the foreign country, but also manufacture 
single products, ranges of products, or varieties of products for the parent com-
pany.  Rationalized manufacturers produce individual products or product 
ranges for the world market. Other MNC units carry out R&D, marketing or nec-
essary production steps. Product specialists have comprehensive responsibili-
ties for a product within an MNC since they develop and manufacture the prod-
uct and sell it worldwide. Finally, strategic independent units have the additional 
freedom to develop and manufacture new products and to set up new markets. 
Beyond these five roles, Schmid (2000) has shown the existence of a large 
number of role typologies. However, newer subsidiary role descriptions tend to 
include very advanced  characteristics of organizational sub-units related to 
strategic importance and influence, such as centers of excellence (Holm & 
Pedersen, 2000). 
Several researchers have focused on changes in subsidiary roles over 
time, emphasizing the extent and reasons for charter “wins”, here defined as 
situations where subsidiaries have extended their business areas within mar-
kets, product and service lines and strategic responsibility. Hood et al. (1994), 
Delany (1998) and Taggart (1999) all used White & Poynter’s (1984) terminol-
ogy to analyze role changes, i.e. the transformation of the subsidiary from one 
role to another, and mostly reported positive changes in terms of charter wins. 
Utilizing different concepts, extended charters were also a general phenomenon 
observed in surveys carried out by Pearce (1999), Egelhoff et al., (1998), Wil-
liams (1998), and Walsh et al. (2002), the latter reporting that 56% of 66 North 
American or Asian-based subsidiaries in China have extended the scope of 
their market activities. Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy (2003) recently provided a specific 
insight into the improvement of acquired firms in the former German Democratic 
Republic and in Hungary, but did not look into role changes per se. Of the nine 
Hungarian cases, only one subsidiary had been promoted to be a global center 
of excellence for R&D. 
Researchers have rarely carried out surveys on subsidiary demotion, 
though Galunic & Eisenhardt (1996) carefully described charter losses in 9 mul-
tinational divisions. Birkinshaw (1996) reported 31 cases of charter change in 3 
six subsidiaries, which led to charter loss in six cases
3. Most surveys have 
reported only a few cases of charter loss. Taggart (1999), for example, 
observed 9 charter losses in a sample of 131 US and European-owned UK-
based subsidiaries. Other surveys have only embraced status quo situations, 
like in Egelhoff et al. (1998), whose sample included 7 non-changing subsidiar-
ies out of 16. Other descriptions of charter losses are often anecdotal in nature, 
as in the case of Hood & Young (1982).  
What causes subsidiary charter loss? Only a few surveys have pointed out 
reasons, and most explanations to subsidiary developments need to be 
revealed from charter win situations; these arguments have to be turned around 
when explaining charter losses. Nevertheless, in the survey by Birkinshaw 
(1996), it turned out that the engine for positive subsidiary development was the 
possession of distinct capabilities, and that charter losses occurred either in 
situations where such capabilities were lacking or in cases of where there was a 
mismatch between subsidiary resources and the remaining corporation’s busi-
ness activities and interests. Galunic and Eisenhardt (1996) likewise found the 
mismatch between divisional charters and corporate core business areas as a 
reason for demotions. Secondly, they focused on loss of charters due to failures 
in operating new business areas, and, finally, they paid attention to situations 
where a division lost its charters to other divisions due to the internal competi-
tion within the MNC. Conversely, charter loss is not necessarily negative. 
Galunic & Eisenhardt (1996), for example, showed how radically growing divi-
sions lost peripheral business areas in order to concentrate on their new char-
ters.  
From these prior surveys, a pattern emerges where explanations to sub-
sidiary charter development were to be found in host country factors, i.e. the 
local market economy and the actors related to this market, subsidiary 
resources,  i.e. resource-based characteristics of the subsidiary and, finally, 
MNC  organizational and structural factors, which included specific circum-
stances regarding both the configuration of the MNC and headquarters behav-
iors. Birkinshaw & Hood (1997) also found evidence for this tripartition. Rugman 
& Verbeke (2001) likewise described three drivers of subsidiary evolution, 
namely, the degree of parent company assignment, subsidiary choice, and local 
environment determinism. Crookell and Morrison (1990) operated with a similar 
concept defining the competitive conditions in the industry, headquarters strat-
egy toward international markets, and finally subsidiary initiatives to position 
themselves within the corporation as factors influencing the charter of the sub-
sidiary. It is therefore relevant to establish the reasons for subsidiary role devel-
opment (also in relation to charter loss) in a) the host country environment, b) 
                                            
3  Birkinshaw (1996) used the word “mandate” instead of charter, and defined mandate (p. 467) 
as a “business, or element of business, in which the subsidiary participates and for which it 
has responsibilities beyond its national market.”  
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within the subsidiary, and c) in the MNC. These three factors are discussed in 
the following three paragraphs.  
The stage and the development of the local economy affect subsidiary 
evolution, and extension of business areas is an outcome of spillover effects 
from local market opportunities. One ‘classic’ example is the development of 
foreign-owned subsidiaries in Canada, which underwent what White & Poynter 
(1984) described as a transition from market-oriented units to more production-
oriented and strategically independent units. This development was a spillover 
effect from the Canadian government’s efforts to improve the level of develop-
ment to avoid negative effects of a high proportion of US ownership in the 
Canadian industry. Similar effects have been shown to occur in Ireland (Egel-
hoff et al., 1998) and China (Walsh et al., 2002). Government-initiated devel-
opment programs targeting, for example, infrastructures and universities have 
generally been supportive of subsidiary development (Rugman & Douglas, 
1986; Egelhoff et al., 1998); so has direct subsidizing (Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1997). Furthermore, improvements of the host country’s economic level of 
development typically improved market conditions, thus offering subsidiaries 
more opportunities to establish autonomous business relationships (Ivarsson, 
2002) and, as shown by Egelhoff et al. (1998), to start up research processes. 
Holm et al. (2003) showed how access to skilled personnel combined with pres-
sures from local competitors and customers had a positive effect on a subsidi-
ary’s ability to develop capabilities, especially when tapping into leading edge 
clusters (Birkinshaw and Hood, 2000) through highly embedded relationships 
(Andersson et al., 2002). In general, these positive externalities speak for char-
ter wins, whereas negative externalities argue for charter losses.  
The position a subsidiary holds in the MNC is a reflection of its strengths 
and weaknesses (Luo, 2005). According to a resource-based view, a firm’s – in 
this case a subsidiary’s - stock of resources and capabilities determine its evo-
lution (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). This way of thinking initiates from Penrose’s 
(1959) pioneering work, which demonstrated how the growth rate of a firm is 
constrained by its reservoir of resources and how these resources are man-
aged. Following this line of argumentation, capabilities such as specialized 
technologies (Egelhoff et al., 1998), product portfolios (Hood et al., 1994), 
managerial expertise (Rugman & Douglas, 1986), entrepreneurial efforts 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1997; Crookell & Morrisson, 1990) and especially internal 
R&D processes play a central role in subsidiary development processes 
(Pearce, 1999; Florida, 1997; Taggart, 1998). Conversely, lack of resources is a 
strong predictor for charter losses. Egelhoff et al. (1998) exemplified this situa-
tion by referring to lack of pursuing technology-based initiatives. Birkinshaw 
(1996) further showed how non-progressing subsidiaries lost charters to those 
competing corporate affiliates that have had developed new generations of 
products or services. Demotions are, so to say, the outcome of an increasing 5 
mismatch between the subsidiary charter and the MNC's core areas of business 
(Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996).  
The development of distinct capabilities is paradoxical, since these often 
are unique and – thereby - different to the capabilities and resources held by the 
remaining MNC. This brings about a knowledge gap between other corporate 
entities (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001) and lowers absorptive capacity (Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998). Besides, studies of knowledge flows within the MNC have indi-
cated that transferring knowledge has been far from easy. Szulanski (1996) 
identified two sets of factors that hinder internal knowledge flows: motivational 
factors and knowledge-related factors. The latter emanated from the character 
of knowledge (e.g. tacit, context-specific and ambiguous) that has made it diffi-
cult to transfer knowledge from one location to another, while the former is more 
related to the lack of incentive structure of the MNC. Consequently, this will 
slow down subsidiary developing processes. Therefore, distinctive capabilities 
advocate charter wins but simultaneously can bring the subsidiary in a more 
isolated and demoted position.  
Finally, the role of a subsidiary is determined not only by environmental 
influences and the capabilities available to the subsidiary, but also by strategic 
decision-making at the headquarters level and the degree of autonomy of the 
subsidiary (Morrison & Roth, 1993). To provide a few examples, Egelhoff et al. 
(1998) showed that headquarters’ assignments were central to the evolution of 
subsidiaries, and Lou (2005) explained how subsidiaries compete for parent 
resources and support, and how more resources from headquarters will reduce 
the subsidiary’s dependency to local resource possessors. The concept of 
resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) can also be applied internally 
in the corporation, where the degree to which headquarters depends on the 
subsidiary will influence its decisions concerning subsidiary charters (Holm & 
Pedersen, 2000). Furthermore, one must remember that an MNC is also a 
political organization (Forsgren, 1989) and, as Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle (1999) 
have suggested that the corporate immune system is a reason for the absence 
of assignments. In this case, headquarters may oppose proposals from the 
subsidiaries because of strict funding criteria, bureaucratic inertia or political 
reasons. However, the willingness of headquarters to allocate the subsidiary the 
resources and to delegate the strategic responsibilities needed for charter 
changes also depends on more economically rational motives. When the home 
market of an MNC matures or its technological advantages disappear, a need 
for corporate resource reallocation then arises (Prahalad & Doz, 1981; Birkin-
shaw & Hood, 1998). In this regard, Delany (1998) observed that the closure of 
one subsidiary sometimes resulted in the upgrading of another. Altered market 
conditions, poor management, and other factors elsewhere in the MNC may 
therefore prompt an MNC headquarters to reconfigure the resources and stra-
tegic responsibilities of its subsidiaries. These strategic redeployments may be 
either parent-driven (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998), where headquarters urges  
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subsidiaries to compete for mandates on market-alike conditions, or subsidiary-
driven (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1997), where subsidiaries act as "incubators" that 
autonomously start up activities like R&D that later qualify them for strategic 
responsibilities.  
A subsidiary's charter reflects simultaneous influences from local environ-
mental factors and internal corporate requirements, both of which determine the 
nature of the subsidiary’ resources. It is a paradox that the variation between 
the different subsidiaries external networks within the MNC, which can be seen 
as an advantage for the development of new knowledge, will turn into a disad-
vantage when the MNC wants to transfer the knowledge among the MNC units 
(Forsgren, 1997). In terms of institutionalization theory (e.g., Hawley, 1968; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991 Scott, 1995; Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999), foreign subsidiaries are subject to simultaneous isomorphic pulls 
both from their local environment and from their MNC, which bases its actions 
on its own institutions, rules, norms, values and cognitive mindsets. Subsidiar-
ies therefore exist in a world of institutional duality (Kostova & Roth, 2002), 
caught between their MNC institutions and local institutions. Subsidiaries 
choosing to be highly externally embedded (Andersson et al. 2002) might be 
downgraded to narrowly defined activities and markets unless the subsidiary is 
able to produce resources upon which other corporate units depend. Highly 
internally embedded subsidiaries might face difficulties in tapping into the local 
market, which, again, will decrease performance. An imbalance between inter-
nal and external embeddedness might then lead to charter loss.  
Closing this discussion, charter loss manifests in terms of closure of certain 
activities (sales, production, R&D), the loss of product or service lines, and 
decreased market operations. Furthermore, the subsidiary might lose strategic 
responsibilities within the above-mentioned areas, and decision-making would 
take place at headquarters instead.  
3 Methodology 
Given the scarcity of direct knowledge about charter loss in the literature, a 
single case study approach is used to provide more data on this subject. The 
case study is designed as being both descriptive and explanatory (Yin 1989). It 
aims to provide insights into the actors, interests and dynamics of charter losses 
as well as to explain to what extent and by what combination host country, sub-
sidiary and MNC structural factors lead to situations in which a subsidiary loses 
its charter. The latter is basically done by matching the case study results with 
the theoretical propositions developed by inverting the reasons for upgrading in 7 
Chapter 2. Case study
4 data was collected in more than 20 interviews carried 
out between 1999 and 2003 at different Siemens units in Germany, Austria and 
Hungary, both at the headquarters and the subsidiary level. The semi-structured 
interviews based on an interview questionnaire usually lasted an hour and a 
half. Most of the interviews were conducted at the interviewees' offices. 
Because of confidentiality obligations, no interview partner is mentioned by 
name. An anonymous list of the interview partners is given in the footnote 
below.
5 Interviews at the German headquarters and with German or Austrian 
Expatriates in Hungary were conducted in German. Interviews with Hungarian 
managers and Hungarian Stakeholders were conducted in Hungarian with the 
help of a Hungarian associate  who simultaneously translated the interviews. 
Access to interview partners was first eased by a sponsor at the headquarters. 
After conducting a few interviews, we decided to use a snowballing approach in 
which the interview partners were asked to name other relevant interview part-
ners (Welch et al. 2002). This helped us to include all relevant actor groups (in 
line with the basic provisions of policy network analysis, cf. Marin & Mayntz 
1991) and ensured a multi-facet view on the rather conflict-burdened issue of 
charter losses. All interviews except one were taped and transcribed. Triangu-
lated with document data, a summary report was produced and sent to the 
interviewees for approval to eliminate mistakes, misunderstandings and analyti-
cal error. In addition, we had two intense feedback meetings with interview 
partners to improve data interpretation.  
                                            
4  The case study was undertaken in the realm the project: "Exogenous influences in path 
dependent transformation processes: The effects of German FDI on work organization and 
labor relations in Hungary". The project was funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and 
hosted by the Free University, Berlin. 
5  1 top manager at the divisional headquarters in Bruchsal/Germany; 1 middle manager at the 
divisional headquarters in Bruchsal/Germany; 1  middle manager at the Siemens 
headquarters, Munich/Germany; 1  representative of the general works council (Konzern-
betriebsrat) and member of the supervisory board at Siemens AG, Munich/Germany; 
1  middle manager for corporate personnel at Siemens AG, Berlin/Germany; 4  middle 
managers at Siemens Österreich AG, Vienna/Austria, working as expatriates at Telefongyár, 
3  top managers at Telefongyár, Budapest/Hungary; 7  middle managers at Telefongyár, 
Budapest; 1  middle manager at Sysdata, Budapest/Hungary, a software spin-off of Tele-
fongyár; 2  representatives from the labor side at Telefongyár, Budapest/Hungary, 
1  representative from the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (ITD), Budapest/ 
Hungary, 1 representative from the Hungarian Ministry of Economics dealing with foreign 
direct investments, Budapest/Hungary. A few of the interviews were group interviews; some 
people were interviewed several times while drafting this study.   
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4  The Case: Charter Loss at Siemens Telefongyár, 
Hungary 
Siemens Telefongyár is the Hungarian subsidiary of the Siemens telecommuni-
cation switching business. In socialist times, it was a model company at national 
level, producing information and communication hardware on its own techno-
logical basis with more then 3,000 employees (1989). Telefongyár today is 
merely a peripheral location fully dependent on company supplies. Its basic task 
is to market Siemens switching equipment and some other Siemens telecom-
munications hardware in Hungary. Siemens’ original motive in taking over 
Telefongyár in 1991 was to gain access to the Hungarian market. The first big 
tender to serve the local telecom operator (MATAV) was won in the early 
1990s, the second one (extending till 2001) in the mid-1990s. Both tenders 
encompassed a formal obligation to maintain local production. Thus, initial tran-
sitional restructuring of Telefongyár only extended to sharply downsizing its dif-
ferent functions (production, R&D, sales), transforming the company into 
miniature replica of the Siemens switching division.
6 This change, which basi-
cally meant implementing Siemens standards throughout Telefongyár, was by 
and large translated into action through a broad transfer of know-how from other 
Siemens switching units in Germany and Austria. Production was completely 
modernized, e.g., by transferring state-of-the-art production lines for the fitting 
and soldering of printed circuit boards from the Siemen's Viennese switching 
plant.
7 Workers as well as the new management team of Telefongyár were 
trained by a large number of German and Austrian expatriates(15-20 at peak 
times). Training extended to all functional areas and lasted up to three years. 
Young employees of Telefongyár were generally given preference with some of 
the old top management - especially those that had good contacts to the 
national Telecommunications operator MATAV were also kept.  
This strategy of modernizing the company via intensive cross-border 
transfers while maintaining established political relations proved to be very suc-
cessful. A long period of positive business development and high dividends fol-
lowed. For many years the profit rate of Telefongyár clearly exceeded the profit 
rate of other Siemens’ subsidiaries in Hungary as well as the profit rates of 
Siemens switching subsidiaries elsewhere in Europe. However, the situation 
changed after 10 successful years, finally leading to the closure of production at 
Telefongyár at the end of 2002. This charter loss downsized the subsidiary to 
approx. 250 employees and altered the role of Telefongyár from a miniature 
replica to a marketing satellite. What caused this charter loss? Following our 
theory, reasons for charter losses can be found in the host country environment, 
within the subsidiary or within the MNC. As we will see in greater detail below, 
                                            
6  The more then 3000 employees were downsized to 1.200 before Siemens took over 
Telefongyár in late 1991. This number steadily decreased over 700 in the mind 1990ies to 
400 at the turn of the century and 350 in 2001.  
7  Different kinds of printed circuit boards are the main components of switching systems.  9 
reasons for the charter loss at Siemens Telefongyár touch upon all these ana-
lytical categories. Furthermore the reasons are highly interrelated and are sub-
ject to divergent interpretations that reflect the micro-political interests of the key 
actors.  
One important reason for Telefongyár's charter loss can be found in the 
host country environment. Following ten years of constant investment, 
Telefongyár's main customer , MATAV, finalized the basic modernization (digi-
talization) of its telecommunications network in 2001, with no funds left for a 
further upgrading of the network (by e.g. broadband applications or voice over 
IP technologies). This came close to a complete market collapse, since MATAV 
in 2002 still had about 85% of the fixed network business in Hungary. Given the 
transitional status of the country, Telefongyár had only a few other local cus-
tomers in the telecommunications industry to whom it could sell its printed cir-
cuits. These rather scare opportunities to establish local business relationships 
were also highly contested. For one, due to the foreign-led transition strategy of 
Hungary, many of the potential customers were subsidiaries of (other) western 
MNCs sourcing largely from captive markets or from well-established external 
suppliers. Secondly, some big contract manufacturers such as Flextronix were 
producing printed circuits on a much larger scale in Hungary.  
The rather small scale of the production site at Telefongyár also turned out 
to be an important subsidiary-related reason for the charter loss at Telefongyár. 
Imposed by a clause in the tender, Siemens only established a very small pro-
duction unit just to satisfy local demand. Once it turned out that a new tender 
(with the rather favorable conditions of the two pervious tenders) was not in 
sight, the Telefongyár production site as it existed then became obsolete. 
Prompted by warnings from the headquarters office to close down production, 
the local management started to look for new orders from other Siemens’ divi-
sions as well as from external customers in the late 1990s. These initiatives 
secured a second wave of modernization at the production site - one that was 
strongly desired by the local management but already heavily criticized by some 
headquarters managers, yet the orders gained were not sufficient to justify an 
enlargement of the production to a competitive scale. According to some voices 
from the headquarters office, the failure to manage the new situation was due to 
a lack of entrepreneurial effort and experience. The local Hungarian manage-
ment, however, more or less blamed it mainly on the rather uncooperative 
behavior of other Siemens divisions
8 as well as on the ethnocentric attitude of 
the headquarters office (see below). A second, rather complementary subsidi-
ary-related reason for Telefongyár's charter loss is its scarcity of R&D 
resources. After spinning off some of its R&D activities to Sysdata, a newly 
                                            
8  This refers to Telefongyár's attempt to “rent out” the whole production capacity to another 
division of Siemens. However shortly before a formal agreement was reached, the 
management at this other division changed, with the new management canceling the plan.   
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founded Siemens software subsidiary in Hungary, Telefongyár's remaining R&D 
resources were closely tied to local product adaptations. Thus, there were no 
R&D resources left to pursue technology-based initiatives that could eventually 
lead to highly popular new products ( requiring  an upscale of production).  
Apart from host country and subsidiary related factors,  there were also 
MNC structural and organizational factors contributing to the charter loss at 
Telefongyár.  The main background here is an internal restructuring program of 
Siemens' switching division. Released in 1996, this program should cope with 
some major structural changes in the telecommunications industry.
9 It contained 
two basic provisions: Firstly to drastically lower the number of about 50 Sie-
mens switching plants all over the world (1996), and secondly to build a more 
hierarchical production structure. The final structure, which was originally 
scheduled to be fully implemented in 2004, only foresaw three centers of com-
petence (one in Europe, one in Asia and one in the Americas), which were to 
handle all production and innovative R&D, as well as a system of about 7 
regional logistic centers (depending on the business volume of the world region) 
and as many configuration satellites as needed (basically serving as assembly 
points and customer interfaces).  Faced with this strategic reorganization plan 
and realizing that the existing production site was too small to survive, the local 
management of Telefongyár endeavored to promote their location as the center 
for the planned concentration of European production. Using the strategy 
"offense  is the best form of defense”, they argued that Siemens should enlarge 
the production site in Hungary rather than closing because of it had well-quali-
fied but inexpensive workers, adequate space for expansion, good transport 
routes and, last but not least, the favorable tax provisions that Siemens had 
negotiated at the take-over of Telefongyár but had previously only taken limited 
advantage of. This undertaking placed Telefongyár in immediate competition 
with other plants of the same division, particularly with a factory in Southwest 
Germany which, up to that point, was the biggest factory and the largest R&D 
center in Europe for these types of products.  
Following some negotiations, the headquarters of the switching division 
took the decision to close production at Telefongyár, to relocate production to 
                                            
9  Since the early 1980ies, political liberalization, technical change and increasing transnational 
standardization of networks have eroded the close relationship between national telephone 
operators and their preferred equipment suppliers. The introduction of competition in their 
former monopoly markets forced the service operators to lower the prices for their services 
and to increase demand-led investments in their networks. Most of the operators abandoned 
their former policy to require local production. In addition, ‘squeezed’ by competition, they put 
more pressure on prices leading to a dramatic fall of the price per subscriber line (from 1995: 
200 US dollars to about 50 US dollars in 2001). For the equipment manufacturers, these 
changes translated into a strong rationalization potential, due to the fact that once there is no 
more political requirement for local production, small plants such as the one of Siemens in 
Hungary turned out to be relatively inefficient.  11 
the factory in Southwest Germany and to promote this factory to the European 
center of competence. It remained controversial, which factors finally influenced 
this decision. Representatives of the parent company referred to the more 
advantageous scale of production and R&D at the factory in Southwest Ger-
many, with a geographical separation between production and R&D generally 
considered as disadvantageous. On the level of the subsidiary management 
opinions ranged from “information problems in the international matrix structure” 
to the accusation that the divisional headquarters was pursuing an ethnocentric 
policy of “location protectionism contrary to all economic reason”. The some-
what hash reactions among the subsidiary managers are easily to understand, 
no matter whether their arguments hold true or not. Their initiative to gain a 
European mandate for the production of switching components was turned into 
the opposite. By order of headquarters, production was closed and Telefongyár 
was downgraded to a marketing satellite. It is very likely that Telefongyár will 
remain within this role in the foreseeable future. With new headquarters 
assignments very unlikely, the loss of the productive base at Telefongyár, more 
or less also forecloses future subsidiary initiatives to upgrade in role. A further 
carter loss however is rather unlikely too, given the daily need for service and 
maintenance in the switching business.  
5 Discussion   
"To what extent is the case of Siemens Telefongyár typical for subsidiary busi-
ness area demotion?" is a question that remains to be answered in quantitative 
studies. However, this single case study made it clear that our theoretical pos-
tulations developed by inverting the reasons for upgrading do have a strong 
potential for explaining charter losses. Beyond that, the case study stresses that 
there is no single reason for charter loss, but multiple interdependent reasons. 
In the case of Telefongyár, subsidiary-related weaknesses, such as the lack of 
R&D resources, small production size and the lack of entrepreneurial experi-
ence only became a problem after significant changes in the host country envi-
ronment occurred, such as a drop and later the collapse of the incumbent mar-
ket. Nonetheless, charter loss still was not completely unavoidable. Drawing on 
MNC structural factors, such as the existence of a world-wide reorganization 
program, as well as strengths of the host country environment (low labor costs, 
skilled workers) and the subsidiary (the favorable tax regime that Siemens had 
negotiated for Telefongyár), the local management of Telefongyár was able to 
draft a proposal that not only aimed to avert the charter loss, but even implied a 
charter win.  
As we already know, the headquarters refused this proposal. The Hungar-
ian production was relocated to a competing subsidiary in Germany, which at 
the same time was promoted to the European of center of competence in  
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switching where all production and most R&D was concentrated. This sheds 
light on the pivotal role of strategic decision-making at the headquarters level, 
not only for new mandates at the subsidiary level, as Egelhoff (1998) has 
pointed out, but also for charter losses at the subsidiary level. To what extent 
strategic decision-making was based on ethnocentric rationale in our case study 
is hard to say. Even though claims of ethnocentric behavior in the strategic 
decision-making of the headquarters (closing down production in Hungary and 
promoting competition from a German plant) seem to echo the strong disap-
pointment of some managers at Telefongyár, they do have some plausibility. 
Closing production and laying off workers seems to be much easier and 
cheaper in weakly institutionalized countries such as Hungary than in strongly 
institutionalized countries such as Germany (Tempel 2001). Moreover, trade 
union power is especially high at Siemens in Germany. In addition, the head-
quarters claim that separating production from R&D is generally disadvanta-
geous is not a unanimous assessment within the telecommunications industry. 
The French competitor Alcatel or Cisco of the US, for instance, are successfully 
following a strategy to outsource considerable parts of their production to con-
tract manufacturers (Jürgens & Sablowski, 2004). 
No matter how strongly political reasons figured into the decision to close 
down production at Telefongyár, the sheer fact that the closure happened indi-
cates an underlying change in the degree of headquarters' dependence on the 
Hungarian subsidiary, as the resource dependency theory suggests (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Considering the fact that Siemens in 1989 sold its switching 
systems in more then 100 countries of the world, and further considering the 
modest size of the Hungarian market, it is obvious that headquarters was never 
absolutely dependent on the Hungarian subsidiary. However, not to miss profit-
able business opportunities in the emerging Central and East European infra-
structure markets meant getting on the market quickly and having effective 
access to local infrastructure providers – something that was best realized by 
joining forces with well-established local partners. In our case, Siemens joined 
forces with Telefongyár, whose top management had very good relations with 
the big national telecommunications operator MATAV. Winning the first tender, 
the so-called systems selection tender, however, already weakened the power 
position of Telefongyár's management. Once the decision for a certain switching 
system is made, a path for future investments is created. This materialized in a 
second tender won by Telefongyár in the mid 1990s. The only reason why the 
Hungarian production did not became obsolete at that time was the fact that 
Hungarian forces succeeded to include a production clause into the second 
tender, too. Thus, around the same time as Siemens' divisional headquarters 
released its plan to concentrate switching production in three plants worldwide, 
it was forced to further maintain the small-scale production site in Hungary. But 
a few years later, the privatization of Matav (now belonging to the Deutsche 
Telekom) and a downturn in the market from the late 1990s onwards, weakened 
the position of local subsidiary vis-à-vis the headquarters. With the second ten-13 
der expired in 2001 and no other big tender in sight, the headquarters office 
could have decided to close down production at Telefongyár by the end of 2002 
without fearing negative repercussions from the main customer or the local 
management.  
6  Implications for Management Practices at the Subsidiary 
Level  
What does this case tell local subsidiary managers? A rather self-evident point 
draws on the interrelatedness of the different reasons for the charter loss. If a 
lack of subsidiary resources and capabilities only turns into a problem when 
factor endowments or the markets of the host country are deteriorating, the 
times of favorable host country conditions have to be used to improve subsidi-
ary resources and capabilities and to readjust the business of the subsidiary.  
To make charter losses less likely, these readjustments should aim at a 
somewhat more balanced internal and external embeddedness, as Andersson 
et al. (2002) proposed. In addition, both the external and the internal 
embeddedness should focus on more than one big customer, as our case 
clearly points out. While struggling for a deeper internal embeddeness, the local 
subsidiary management must, above all, sell the locational advantages of the 
host country. This implies a solid knowledge of investment promotion programs, 
market opportunities, and innovative sources, etc. The local subsidiary man-
agement struggling for a deeper external embeddedness has to sell firm-spe-
cific advantages to new customers.  This implies not only a good sense of iden-
tifying new potential customers and creative ways to build relationships, but also 
a solid knowledge of the product and service range of the MNC.  
Needless to say, readjusting the embeddedness of a subsidiary is a difficult 
task, even if the headquarters is giving the subsidiary some room to at least try 
it, as in the case of Telefongyár. For the headquarters office, it is often more 
convenient and less risky to decide to let a subsidiary lose a charter than to give 
credence to solutions that promise profitability in the future. This is especially 
the case if the charter in question does not fit into the headquarters' blueprint of 
inter-company division of labor, as in our case study. In such situations, which 
rather seem to be the rule than the exception, it is important for the subsidiary 
management to have access to headquarters in order to have at least a chance 
to influence development. This access must be effective, i.e. a purely formal 
right of access normally is not sufficient. In order to actually be able to influence 
processes that might lead to a charter loss, the management of the subsidiary 
must know how relevant to themselves any changes in corporate strategy are; 
they must also know what the essential decision-making criteria are, what alter- 
14 
natives are under discussion, and which factions support which positions. As a 
lot of this information is very sensitive from an organizational policy standpoint, 
it can only be available when there is a regular confidential exchange between 
the management of the subsidiary and those persons who are responsible for 
the decisions (either in the parent company or in other units of the MNC). Thus, 
constant interpersonal networking (Ghoshal et al., 1994) is a key prerequisite to 
avoid charter losses or to soften the negative repercussions of charter loss.  
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